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REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
IN BANKRUPTCY: FINDING A BALANCE
IN 11 U.S.C. § 1113
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the common law and all versions of United States cor-
porate reorganization law' have enabled bankruptcy trustees' to reject
executory contracts.3 In the 1970's, debtors began using this fundamen-
1. The Constitution provides Congress with the power "[t]o establish ... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4. Congress first enacted uniform bankruptcy laws in 1898. See Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. The first major enactment of corporate reorganization laws
was the Chandler Act. See Act of June 22, 1938 (Chandler Act), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840
(repealed 1978). This Act remained in effect until it was superceded by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (hereinafter the Bankruptcy Code).
2. For the purposes of this Note, the term "debtor" refers either to a trustee or a
debtor-in-possession. Traditionally, when a person filed for bankruptcy or was declared a
bankrupt, a trustee either was elected by the debtor's creditors or appointed by the court
and was responsible for collection and distribution of the debtor's property. See 1 Norton
Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 1.03 (W. Norton ed. 1981). Modem business reorgani-
zation contains no provision for automatic appointment of a trustee. See M. Bienenstock,
Bankruptcy Reorganization 288 (1987). Rather, the bankruptcy court can appoint a
trustee under § 1104(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986), either "for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross misman-
agement" of the debtor's affairs by the current management, 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)
(1982), or if "appointment [of a trustee] is in the interests of creditors, any equity security
holders, and other interests of the estate." Ido at § 1104(a)(2). A strong presumption
exists against appointment of a trustee in chapter 11 reorganizations. See In re Garland
Corp., 6 Bankr. 456, 460 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1980); In re Cole, 66 Bankr. 75, 76 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1986); In re St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Inc., 63 Bankr. 131, 138 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1985).
In cases where a trustee has not been appointed, the debtor remains in possession of the
estate and exercises the powers and duties of a trustee with the exception of the trustee's
investigatory duties. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Such a debtor is referred
to as a "debtor in possession." See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1982). The duties of the trustee
are set out in § 1106 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that the trustee shall be
accountable for all property received; examine proofs of claims and object to improper
claims; furnish information concerning the estate and its administration if requested by a
party in interest; make periodic reports and summaries of the operation of the business;
make a final report and file an accounting with the court; file a list of creditors, schedules
of assets and liabilities, current income and expenditures, and statements of the debtor's
affairs; investigate acts, conduct, assets, liabilities and financial condition of the debtor
file a plan of reorganization or otherwise dispose of the case; provide information for the
payment of back taxes; and after confirmation of a plan of reorganization, file such re-
ports as are necessary. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). When a
debtor-in-possession acts as trustee, § 1104(b) provides that an examiner may be ap-
pointed to investigate the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
3. At common law, a bankruptcy trustee had the power to reject an executory con-
tract if, in his opinion, it would be profitable or desirable to do so. See United States
Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry., 150 U.S. 287, 299-300 (1893); In re Frazin, 183 F. 28, 29-31
(2d Cir. 1910). See generally Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy
and Reorganization, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 467, 468-72 (1964). Although the term "execu-
tory contract" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, see NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984), the legislative history to 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982 & Supp. IV
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tal bankruptcy power4 to reject collective bargaining agreements
("CBA's").5 Certain courts held that this use of the bankruptcy power
was acceptable,6 while others concluded that it implicated the national
labor policy of encouraging collective bargaining.7 In NLRB v. Bildisco
& Bildisco,8 the Supreme Court authorized rejection of CBA's under sec-
tion 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,9 holding that rejection was not an
1986) indicates that an executory contract is one "on which performance remains due to
some extent on both sides." See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 522 n.6 (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 347, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963,
6303); see also Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 Minn. L.
Rev. 439, 460 (1973) (stating that an executory contract is one "under which the obliga-
tion of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that
the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing
the performance of the other"). See generally M. Bienenstock, supra note 2, at 441-45.
The ability to reject executory contracts was codified first in the 1930's, spurred by the
advent of corporate reorganization. See Bankruptcy Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424,
§ 77(B)(b)(6), 48 Stat. 911, 914 (amending the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat.
544) (repealed 1938). Section 77(B)(b)(6) provided that "[a] plan of reorganization
within the meaning of this section ...may reject contracts of the debtor which are
executory in whole or in part, including unexpired leases except contracts in the public
authority." Id. Less than five years later, the Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat.
840 (1938), superceded this section with two separate sections, § 116 for corporate reor-
ganizations, and § 313 for arrangements of unsecured debts. See Silverstein, supra, at 467
n.4. Section 116 provided that "[u]pon the approval of a petition, the judge may...
permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor ... upon notice to the parties to
such contracts and to such other parties in interest as the judge may designate." Act of
June 22, 1938 (Chandler Act), ch. 575, § 116, 52 Stat. 840, 884-85 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 516 (1976)) (repealed 1978). Section 313 provided that "[u]pon the filing
of a petition, the court may... permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor,
upon notice to the parties to such contracts and to such other parties in interest as the
court may designate." Act of June 22, 1938 (Chandler Act), ch. 575, § 313(1), 52 Stat.
840, 906 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1976)) (repealed 1978). This lan-
guage remained in effect until the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 516, 713 (1976) (repealed 1978). Under the Bankruptcy Code these two sec-
tions are combined in § 365(a), providing that "the trustee, subject to the court's ap-
proval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. IV 1986). The debtor has a duty to reject executory contracts
that do not benefit the estate. See Butterworth v. Degnon Contracting Co., 214 F. 772,
773 (2d Cir. 1914); Investors Dev. Co. v. Forum Homes, Inc. (In re Investors Dev. Co.),
7 Bankr. 772, 774 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980); M. Bienenstock, supra note 2, at 456-57.
4. See supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 518 (1984); Local Unions 20
v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc. (In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc.), 702 F.2d 890,
1892 (11 th Cir. 1983); see also Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v.
REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir.) (using § 365's predecessor, § 313(1) of
the Bankruptcy Act), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455
v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 700 (2d Cir. 1975) (same).
6. See, eg., Local Unions 20 v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc. (In re Brada Miller
Freight Sys., Inc.), 702 F.2d 890, 894 (11th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco (In
re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72, 84 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
7. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express,
Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169 (2d Cir.) (decided under § 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (same), appeal dismissed, 595 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1979).
8. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
9. See id. at 522-23.
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unfair labor practice.10
In response to Bildisco, Congress passed section 1113 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code," providing that CBA's can be rejected only if the debtor
follows certain procedural steps and meets certain substantive require-
ments.12 The procedural steps contained in section 1113(b) require that
the debtor propose to the employees' representative modifications in the
CBA "necessary to permit reorganization of the debtor"1 3 before the
bankruptcy court can rule on the debtor's motion to reject. The debtor
also must meet with the employees' representative 4 and, in good faith,
attempt to reach an agreement. 5 If no compromise is achieved, the sub-
stantive requirements of section 1113(c) mandate that the bankruptcy
court approve rejection only if the procedural steps of section 1113(b)
have been complied with,' the representative of the employees has re-
fused to accept the proposal without good cause,'" and the balance of the
10. See id at 532-33.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. IV 1986).
12. The provision was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 390 (codified in scattered sections of
11 U.S.C.). Section 1113 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under the
provisions of this chapter... may assume or reject a [CBA] only in accordance
with the provisions of this section.
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition [for reorganization] and prior to filing an
application seeking rejection of a [CBA], the debtor in possession or trustee
(hereinafter in this section 'trustee' shall include a debtor in possession), shall-
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees cov-
ered by such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information
available at the time of such proposal, which provides for those necessary
modifications in the employees [sic] benefits and protections that are neces-
sary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors,
the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably; and
(B) provide... the representative of the employees with such relevent infor-
mation as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal pro-
vided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing... the trustee
shall meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representative to confer in
good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of such
agreement.
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a [CBA] only if the
court finds that-
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the require-
ments of subsection (b)(1);
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept such pro-
posal without good cause; and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.
11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. IV 1986).
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A); supra note 12.
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2); supra note 12.
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2); supra note 12.
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(1); supra note 12.
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(2);supra note 12.
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equities clearly favors rejection of the contract.' 8
Recently, a conflict has arisen among the United States Courts of Ap-
peals as to how necessary and to what end proposed modifications must
be in order to meet the threshold necessity requirement. 9 For example,
in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers,2" the Third
Circuit held that a debtor will not be allowed to reject a CBA unless the
debtor's modifications are essential to prevent immediate liquidation of
the business.21 In contrast, the Second Circuit, in Truck Drivers Local
807 v. Carey Transportation Inc.,22 held that a debtor's modifications
need only be necessary for its successful long-term reorganization. 3
Although this specific conflict is new, the clash between the forces that
produced it is not. On one side of the issue is the nation's interest in
rehabilitating failed businesses, on the other is the nation's policy of en-
suring fair employment.
This Note examines the requirements of section 1113 and how it can
be used to resolve these competing interests. Part I looks at the proce-
dural and substantive requirements of section 1113, examining the
Bildisco case and section 1113's legislative history. Part II examines the
case law interpreting section 1113's necessity requirement and concludes
that allowing the debtor to make proposals that are necessary to the suc-
cessful long-term reorganization of the enterprise best effectuates the fun-
damental purpose of the procedural aspect of section 1113. Last, the
Note concludes that if the necessity requirement is properly construed,
the balancing-of-the-equities requirement must then be reexamined to re-
flect proper concern for the hardship of employees faced with losing their
contractual rights.
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3); supra note 12.
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A); supra note 12; supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
20. 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
21. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1088-89
(3d Cir. 1986).
22. 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
23. See id. at 90. Despite the fact that Webster's dictionary indicates that the words
"necessary" and "essential" have the same meaning, compare Webster's New Universal
Unabridged Dictionary 1200 (2d ed. 1983) (stating that necessary means that which
"cannot be dispensed with; essential") with id. at 624 (stating essential means "necessary
to make a thing what it is"), the word "necessary," as a legal term at least, has a more
flexible meaning. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819) ("nec-
essary" "has not a fixed character, peculiar to itself[, but] admits of all degrees of compar-
ison; and is often connected with other words, which increase or diminish the impression
the mind receives of the urgency it imports"); Black's Law Dictionary 928 (5th ed. 1979)
(necessary "must be considered in the connection in which it is used, as it is a word
susceptible of various meanings [and] may import absolute physical necessity ... or it
may import that which is only convenient"). Essential, on the other hand, means
"[i]ndispensibly necessary." See id. at 490.
1236 [Vol. 56
1988] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN BANKRUPTCY
I. REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS UNDER
11 U.S.C. SECTION 1113
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code24 provides a debtor corporation
with the opportunity to reorganize25 while keeping its creditors at bay.26
The rationale underlying reorganization is that a successful reorganiza-
tion is preferable to liquidation:27 a reorganized debtor will be in a better
position to repay its creditors, provide a dividend for its shareholders,
and supply uninterrupted employment for its workers.2" Thus, Chapter
24. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Chapter 11 was enacted as part
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (super-
ceding the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). In a typical Chapter 11 scenario, a debtor, see 11
U.S.C. § 109 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (determining what entities can qualify for Chapter
11 relief), files a petition for reorganization, see I1 U.S.C. § 301 (1982), whereupon an
estate is created, see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), comprised of all the
debtor's property, wherever located and by whomever held, see id., unless exempted by
§ 541(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (Supp. IV 1986). At the time of
filing, all actions to recover claims against the debtor automatically are stayed, see I 1
U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The debtor usually remains in possession of the
estate, see 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), unless a
trustee is appointed, see id at § 1104(a); supra note 2. The debtor continues the business,
see 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (Supp. IV 1986), and sifts through his assets and liabilities, see 11
U.S.C. §§ 541, 1106, 1107 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). It is during this period that a debtor
can elect to accept or reject executory contracts, see id. at § 365, and to reject a CBA, see
11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. IV 1986). After a reasonable period for the debtor to get his
affairs in order, see 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), the debtor files a plan of
reorganization, see id, designating the claims against the estate and the proposed treat-
ment of such claims, see id. at § 1123. Claims are divided by type, see id. at § 507, and
whether they accrued before the filing of the petition ("prepetition"), see I 1 U.S.C.
§ 365(g) (Supp. IV 1986), or after ("postpetition"), see 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). Claims accruing after filing receive priority over prepetition claims. See id. at
§ 507. The debtor's creditors vote on the plan, see id. at § 1126, and a hearing is held on
its confirmation, see 11 U.S.C. § 1128 (1982). The bankruptcy court can confirm the plan
only if it meets the statutory requirements of § 1129. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986). The debtor's handling of executory contracts and CBA's does not require con-
firmation as part of the overall plan of reorganization, see id., but does require court
approval pursuant to either § 365 or § 1113, see id at § 365; 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. IV
1986).
In contrast, Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986), provides for the collection, liquidation and distribution of a debtor's property.
See 3 Collier Bankruptcy Manual 700.01 (L. King ed. 1987). Chapter 7 can be used as
an alternative to filing under Chapter 11, see 3 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice
§ 50.02 (W. Norton ed. 1981), or may be utilized by a Chapter 11 debtor whose attempt
to rehabilitate fails. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112, 1129 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). A plan of
reorganization may also include liquidation. See I1 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1 1) (1982).
26. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
27. In one study of Chapter 7 liquidations, secured creditors recovered less than 33%
of their claims, and unsecured creditors received an average of 8%, whereas in successful
Chapter 11 reorganizations, secured creditors almost always received their claims in full,
while unsecured creditors recovered an average of 19% of their claims under lump sum
payment plans and 10% of their claims under deferred payment plans. See D. Stanley &
M. Girth, Bankruptcy 129-30, 142-43 (1971). Although a plan of reorganization can
provide for liquidation of the debtor, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1 1) (1982), successful reor-
ganization as used in this Note means rehabilitation of the debtor.
28. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984); United States v.
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11 is intended to achieve not mere short-term relief, but successful, long-
term restructuring of the debtor's affairs.29 Accordingly, in order to con-
firm a plan of reorganization the debtor must prove that confirmation is
"not likely to be followed by the [debtor's] liquidation, or the need for
further financial reorganization ... unless such liquidation or reorganiza-
tion is proposed in the plan." 30
The debtor's ability to reject executory contracts under section 365(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code forms an essential part of the mechanism of
Chapter 11.3 1 Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "the
trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any execu-
tory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."32 The scope of section
365 is broad. The trustee may reject an executory contract if he per-
ceives any business advantage in doing so." Accordingly, the bank-
ruptcy court's standard of review is one of business judgment: "the rule
... requires that the decision be accepted by courts unless it is shown
that the bankrupt's decision was one taken in bad faith or in gross abuse
of the bankrupt's retained business discretion."34 Rejection causes the
contract to be deemed breached immediately prior to the debtor's filing
of its petition for Chapter 11 protection, and the promisee has a prepeti-
tion claim against the estate.35
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983); H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6179.
29. For example, under § 1112 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986), the Chapter 11 proceeding may be converted to a liquidation proceeding
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
(providing for collection, liquidation and distribution of a debtor's property), see supra
note 25, or may be dismissed for cause, on the application of either the debtor, see 11
U.S.C. § 1112(a) (Supp. IV 1986), or a party in interest, see id. at § 1112(b). One such
cause for dismissal or conversion exists when the bankruptcy court finds that the debtor's
financial condition is such that there is "no reasonable likelihood that the debtor will be
rehabilitated." 3 Collier Bankruptcy Manual, supra note 25, % 1112.04[2](d)(i), at 1112-
19-20; see In re Kors, Inc., 13 Bankr. 676, 681 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1981).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1 1) (1982). See Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating
Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 589 (6th Cir. 1986);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pikes Peak Water Co. (In re Pikes Peak Water Co.), 779 F.2d 1456,
1460 (10th Cir. 1985).
31. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984); Gibson, The New
Law on Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 11: An Analysis of 11
U.S. C. 1113, 58 Am. Bankr. L.J 325, 325-26 (1984); supra note 3. If the debtor rejects an
executory contract, the Bankruptcy Code treats the contract as if it had been breached
immediately before the date the debtor sought Chapter I 1 protection, see 11 U.S.C. § 365
(g)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and, thus, the breach gives rise to a prepetition claim for
damages against the estate, see id. at § 502(g).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
33. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984); Group of Inst. Inves-
tors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 549-50 (1943); Lubrizol Enter., Inc. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043,
1047 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); Control Data Corp. v. Zelman
(In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1979); supra note 3.
34. Lubrizol Enter., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
35. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 530 (1984); supra note 31.
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In the 1970's, debtors began using section 313 of the Bankruptcy
Act,36 and then its successor, section 365(a), to reject CBA's.3 7 This tac-
tic brought the rehabilitative policy of the Bankruptcy Code38 into con-
flict with the national labor policy of encouraging collective bargaining to
ensure industrial peace.39 In addressing this conflict, appellate courts
agreed that CBA's were executory contracts within section 365(a), 40 but
disagreed whether rejection should proceed under the business judgment
test or under some stricter test.41 Moreover, the courts disagreed
whether a debtor's rejection of a CBA constituted a unilateral modifica-
tion, made without collective bargaining, banned by the National Labor
Relations Act4 as an unfair labor practice.43 In NLRB v. Bildisco &
36. See Act of June 22, 1938 (Chandler Act), ch. 575, § 313(1), 52 Stat. 840, 906
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 313(1)(1976)) (repealed 1978); supra note 1.
37. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 518 (1984); Local Unions 20 v.
Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc. (In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc.), 702 F.2d 890, 892(11th Cir. 1983); Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Ex-
press, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); Shopmen's
Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 700 (2d Cir. 1975).
38. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983); supra notes
25-30 and accompanying text.
39. See National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The Supreme
Court has recognized that "[e]nforcement of the obligation to bargain collectively is cru-
cial to the statutory scheme" of the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952); see NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,
541 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S.
666, 674 (1981). See generally Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 293, 297-300 (1983)
(discussing the policies of the National Labor Relations Act).
40. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 521-22 (1984); see, eg., Local
Unions 20 v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc. (In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc.), 702
F.2d 890, 896-97 (11th Cir. 1983); cf Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel
Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1975) (decided under § 313(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act).
41. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523-24 (1984). Compare
Lubrizol Enter., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finish-
ers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that executory contracts may be
rejected if, absent bad faith or gross abuse of discretion, debtor sees some business advan-
tage in doing so), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986) with Brotherhood of Railway, Airline
and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 172 (2d Cir.) (stating that "in
view of the serious effects which rejection [of the CBAI has on the carrier's employees it
should be authorized only where it clearly appears to be the lesser of two evils and that,
unless the agreement is rejected, the carrier will collapse and the employees will no longer
have their jobs"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975) and Local Unions 20 v. Brada Miller
Freight Sys., Inc. (In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc.), 702 F.2d 890, 899 (1 1th Cir.
1983) (rejecting the holding in REA Express as excessively burdensome to the debtor and
opting for a balancing-of-equities standard, stating that this approach better accommo-
dates the conflicting policies) and In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that a CBA could be rejected only if the equities balance in
favor of rejection and failure to reject would make successful reorganization impossible),
appeal dismissed, 595 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1979).
42. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(5), 49 Stat. 449, 452-53 (1935)
(codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1982)).
43. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 185-86 (1971) (holding unilateral modifications of CBA's impermissible).
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Bildisco,4 the Supreme Court addressed these issues, holding that CBA's
could be rejected under section 365(a) if the balance of equities favored
rejection,45 and that such rejection was not an unfair labor practice.4 6
A. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco47 both illustrates the conflict between the
rehabilitative policy of Chapter 11 and the national labor policy favoring
collective bargaining of the National Labor Relations Act and attempts
to resolve it. Bildisco, a party to a CBA, filed a voluntary petition for
Chapter 11 reorganization.4" The bankruptcy court then permitted
Bildisco to reject its CBA.4 9 Meanwhile, the union had brought an ad-
ministrative proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") against Bildisco alleging violation of the agreement.50 The
NLRB ordered Bildisco to comply with the terms of the CBA,51 notwith-
standing notification that the bankruptcy court had permitted Bildisco to
reject it two months earlier.52 The union appealed the bankruptcy
court's ruling to the district court53 and then to the Third Circuit,
54
while the NLRB applied to the Third Circuit for enforcement of its or-
der.5 The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases, vacating the
bankruptcy court's judgment allowing rejection of the CBA and remand-
ing the case for a determination whether the balance of equities favored
rejection.56 The NLRB and the union appealed to the Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari57 to resolve the conflict among the courts of
appeals as to the proper standard for rejecting CBA's.58
The Supreme Court first addressed the argument that the unique sta-
tus of CBA's so distinguished them from ordinary contracts59 that they
were not covered by section 365, but only by the National Labor Rela-
44. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
45. See id. at 525-26.
46. See id. at 534.
47. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
48. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72, 75 (3d Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
49. See id.
50. See Bildisco & Bildisco, 255 N.L.R.B. 1203, 1203 (1981). The National Labor
Relations Board is "empowered... to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice ... affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
51. See Bildisco, 255 N.L.R.B. at 1205.
52. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
53. See id. at 75.
54. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
55. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
56. See id. at 84-85.
57. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 459 U.S. 1145 (1983).
58. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 521 (1984); supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
59. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-80
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tions Act." The Court determined that because Congress expressly ex-
empted CBA's subject to the Railway Labor Act from section 365(a)6 ,
treatment, but did not provide the same protection to CBA's covered by
the National Labor Relations Act, Congress intended that such CBA's
be covered by section 365(a).62 Accordingly, it held that these types of
contracts could be rejected.63
Next, the Court addressed the argument that even if CBA's were exec-
utory contracts within the meaning of section 365, a stricter standard
than the business judgment test for rejection of CBA's was necessary to
protect the national labor policy. 64 The NLRB and the union had ar-
gued that CBA's could be rejected only if it was essential to prevent liqui-
dation of the debtor. 65 Although the majority concluded that the
business judgment test did not sufficiently protect the national labor pol-
icy,66 it rejected the strict standard,6 7 opting instead for a balancing of
interests approach.68 Accordingly, it stated that rejection requires a find-
ing that such action would serve the bankruptcy policy of encouraging
successful reorganization.69 To determine this, the bankruptcy court
must balance the interests of the affected parties: the debtor, its credi-
tors, and the employees.7'
Last, the Court held that once a debtor files a petition for reorganiza-
tion, enforcement of any CBA shifts from the NLRB to the bankruptcy
courts.7 Accordingly, the NLRB's attempt to enforce the agreement
had "run directly counter to the express provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code."7 2 Thus, the Court held that the unilateral rejection of the CBA
(1960) (stating that a CBA is more than a contract: it represents "an effort to erect a
system of industrial self-government").
60. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522-23 (1984); see also
Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 706 (2d Cir.
1975) (holding that CBA's could be rejected under § 313(l) of the Bankruptcy Act, see
supra note 3).
61. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522-23 (1984) (interpreting 11
U.S.C. § 1167 (1982)).
62. See id. at 523.
63. See id
64. See id
65. See id at 524. The NLRB relied on the Second Circuit's holding in Brotherhood
of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express. Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 172 (2d
Cir.) (holding that CBA's can be rejected only when it appears that, absent rejection, the
debtor will liquidate), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975). See NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 524 (1984).
66. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 524 (1984).
67. See id at 525.
68. See id. at 527; see also Local Unions 20 v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc. (In re
Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc.), 702 F.2d 890, 899 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (rejecting strict stan-
dard as excessively burdensome to debtor and opting for a balancing-of-equities standard,
stating that it better accommodates conflicting policies).
69. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).
70. See id.
71. See id at 530-31.
72. Id at 532. The dissent, however, noted that the majority
points to no provision of [the Bankruptcy] Code that purports to render [the
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did not violate the National Labor Relations Act.7
Four justices dissented from the Court's decision in Bildisco.74 They
argued that the majority undermined the policy behind the National La-
bor Relations Act by holding that unilateral rejection was not an unfair
labor practice, stating the majority was "spawn[ing] precisely the type of
industrial strife that [NLRA] § 8(d) was designed to avoid."" Some
members of Congress, who were already struggling with extensive revi-
sions in the bankruptcy laws, shared this concern. 76
B. The Passage of Section 1113
The specter of debtors unilaterally rejecting CBA's by application of
the bankruptcy laws spurred several pro-labor members of Congress to
propose section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code77 to protect CBA's from
what they perceived as a "new collective-bargaining weapon."'78  They
feared that the Bildisco holding would allow the unilateral rejection,
rather than renegotiation, of CBA's by debtors. 79 This ability would dis-
courage collective bargaining and thus would run counter to the policy
expressed in the National Labor Relations Act.80
The original House of Representatives version of section 11131 would
have enabled a debtor to reject a CBA only upon court approval.8 2 This
employer's duty to bargain collectively under § 8(d) of the NLRA] inapplica-
ble .... Accordingly, in order to achieve its desired result, the Court is forced
to infer from the Bankruptcy Code's general treatment of the executory con-
tracts and from the policies that underlie that treatment, that Congress must
have intended the filing of a bankruptcy petition to render § 8(d) inapplicable.
Id. at 539 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 534.
74. See id. at 535 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 554.
76. See Effect of Bankruptcy Actions on the Stability of Labor-Management Relations
and the Preservation of Labor Standards: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor-
Management Relations and Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the Comm. on Education
and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Rep. Wil-
liam Clay, Chairman, Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations). Congress was revis-
ing the bankruptcy court system because the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) had held part of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 unconstitutional. See id. at 87-88.
77. See Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. UAW (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795
F.2d 265, 266-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 1986).
78. Hearings, supra note 76, at 1 (statement of Rep. Clay).
79. See 130 Cong. Rec. S6184 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
80. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
81. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 277, 130 Cong. Rec. H1842 (daily cd.
Mar. 21, 1984). This draft was passed by the House of Representatives as § 277 of H.R.
5174, a preliminary version of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in scattered sections of II U.S.C.).
82. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 277, 130 Cong. Rec. H1842 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984); Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining Agreement-A
Brief Lesson in the Use of the Constitutional System of Checks and Balances, 58 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 293, 314-15 (1984).
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version would have required the debtor, prior to making a motion to
reject, to propose to the union modifications of the CBA that were neces-
sary for successful reorganization and the preservation of jobs.83 The
bankruptcy court would not have been able to approve the debtor's mo-
tion unless the movant first had conferred with the union in good faith'
and had provided the union with relevant financial and other informa-
tion.8 The court also would have had to determine that, absent rejec-
tion, the jobs of the workers would be lost and any reorganization would
fail. 6 Accordingly, this original House bill would have incorporated a
procedural framework that prevented unilateral rejection of CBA's while
allowing rejection only if necessary to prevent liquidation of the debtor
and to preserve jobs. 7
When the bill reached the Senate, Senator Strom Thurmond and other
members of the Judiciary Committee found the labor provision "com-
pletely unacceptable."8 8 Senator Thurmond instead supported a substi-
tute drafted by the National Bankruptcy Conference, essentially
preserving the Supreme Court's Bildisco standard of balancing the par-
ties' interests.8 9 The Thurmond substitute limited the Bildisco holding,
however, by preventing the debtor from unilaterally rejecting the collec-
tive agreement until thirty days after making a motion to reject.9" The
substitute also gave the debtor additional flexibility by providing emer-
gency relief from the CBA if it proved essential to the continuation of the
debtor's business."
In an effort to find a middle ground between the House provision and
the Thurmond substitute, Senator Robert Packwood proposed an
amendment to the House bill that substantially altered the standards of
the House section.92 The Packwood amendment provided that in order
for the debtor to reject a CBA, he first would have to propose to the
83. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 277, 130 Cong. Rec. H1842 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984); Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 315.
84. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 277, 130 Cong. Rec. H 1842 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984); Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 315.
85. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 277, 130 Cong. Rec. H1842 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984); Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 315.
86. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 277, 130 Cong. Rec. H 1842 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984); Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 315.
87. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1083
(3d Cir. 1986); 130 Cong. Rec. S6184 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood); H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 277, 130 Cong. Rec. H1842 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984); Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 314-15.
88. 130 Cong. Rec. S6082 (daily ed. May 21, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); see
id. at S6091 (statement of Sen. Hatch); Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 317.
89. See 130 Cong. Rec. S6126 (daily ed. May 21, 1984); id. at S6082-84 (statement of
Sen. Thurmond); supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing-of-
the-equities test of Bildisco).
90. See 130 Cong. Rec. S6126 (daily ed. May 21, 1984); id. at S6084 (statement of
Sen. Thurmond); Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 317.
91. See 130 Cong. Rec. S6126 (daily ed. May 21, 1984); id. at S6084 (statement of
Sen. Thurmond).
92. See 130 Cong. Rec. S6181-82, 6184 (daily ed. May 22, 1984).
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employees' representative "minimum modifications in ... employees [sic]
benefits and protections that would permit the reorganization."93 After
making the proposal, the debtor would have to meet with the representa-
tive at reasonable times and, in good faith, attempt to reach mutually
satisfactory modifications of the CBA.94 Under the Packwood amend-
ment, the bankruptcy court could approve rejection only if the debtor
satisfied the above requirements and the employees' representative unjus-
tifiedly refused to accept the proposal.15 In addition to these somewhat
procedural requirements, the Packwood amendment required bank-
ruptcy courts to make a substantive determination that the balance of the
equities clearly favored rejection.96
The purpose of the Packwood amendment was to place primary re-
sponsibility for the modification of a CBA on the parties to the agree-
ment and thus discourage judicial interference.97 The Packwood
amendment, like the provision in the House bill, did not allow unilateral
rejection of the contract by the debtor under any circumstances. 98
The effect of the Packwood amendment's changes to the House bill
was to eliminate the requirement that the proposed alterations to the
CBA be necessary for the preservation of jobs. Instead, the proposal for
modification merely must consider the employees' sacrifices as a factor. 99
Similarly, if the debtor met the amendment's procedural requirements,
the bankruptcy court, prior to certifying the rejection, would not need to
determine that absent rejection the jobs of the workers would be lost and
reorganization would fail."o
After debate, Senators Thurmond and Packwood agreed to have a
conference committee reach a compromise between their conflicting pro-
posals. 10 ' Congress passed the compromise section 1113 on June 29,
93. Id. at S6181.
94. See id. at S6182.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at S6184 (statement of Sen. Packwood).
98. See id. at S6182; H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 277(h), 130 Cong. Rec.
H1842 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984).
99. Compare 130 Cong. Rec. S6181-82 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (stating that the
trustee shall make a proposal "taking into account the best estimate of the sacrifices
expected to be made by all classes of creditors and other affected parties to the reorgani-
zation") with H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 277, 130 Cong. Rec. H1842 (daily cd.
Mar. 21, 1984) (trustee may file a motion to reject if trustee has proposed modifications
necessary for successful reorganization and "preservation of jobs").
100. Compare 130 Cong. Rec. S6182 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (stating that court, in
order to reject a CBA, must determine that procedural requirements have been met, that
union unjustifiably has refused to accept debtor's proposal and that balance of equities
clearly favors rejection) with H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 277, 130 Cong. Rec.
H1842 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984) (stating that court may not approve rejection unless
procedural requirements have been met and, absent rejection, jobs covered by agreement
would be lost and reorganization would fail).
101. See 130 Cong. Rec. S7622-23 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood); Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 318.
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1984102 and the President signed it into law on July 10.103
Section 1113, as finally passed has two aspects: the first involves a
series of procedural requirements designed to promote collective bargain-
ing, " while the second sets out the substantive standards for rejection to
be considered by the bankruptcy court once the procedural hurdles have
been cleared.'0' The procedural aspect of section 1113(b) closely resem-
ble those in the Packwood amendment. 06 The language governing the
focus of the debtor's proposal, however, was changed from "minimum
modifications in... employees [sic] benefits and protections that would
permit the reorganization, taking into account the best estimate of the
sacrifices expected to be made by all classes of creditors and other af-
fected parties"'1 7 to "necessary modifications in the employees [sic] bene-
fits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor and assure[] that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected
parties are treated fairly and equitably."10 The substantive standard of
balancing the equities, contained in section 1113(c), is the same as that of
the Packwood amendment, 09 which slightly modified the balancing of
interests standard enunciated in Bildisco.10 Section 1113, however, in-
corporates the Thurmond substitute provision allowing debtors to seek
emergency relief from their CBA's if such relief is essential to the contin-
uation of the debtor's business. I'
102. 130 Cong. Rec. S8900 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. IV 1986). The section was incorporated in the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 390
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
104. See Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. UAW (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795
F.2d 265, 273 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); 130 Cong. Rec. S8898 (daily
ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
105. See Century Brass Prods., Inc., 795 F.2d at 273; Gibson, supra note 31, at 335.
106. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1087
(3d Cir. 1986); 130 Cong. Rec. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond); id at S8898 (statement of Sen. Packwood).
107. 130 Cong. Rec. S6181 (daily ed. May 22, 1984).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
109. Compare id at § 1113 (c)(2) & (3) (court can approve debtor's motion to reject
only if union has refused to accept proposal without good cause and balance of equities
clearly favors rejection) with 130 Cong. Rec. 56182 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (court can
approve debtor's motion to reject only if union unjustifiably refused to accept proposal
and balance of equities clearly favors rejection).
110. Courts have agreed that the balancing-of-the-equities requirement is an etension
of the Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). See
Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1987); In re
Amherst Sparkle Mkt., Inc., 75 Bankr. 847, 853 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Ken-
tucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 Bankr. 797, 805 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re Cook United,
Inc., 50 Bankr. 561, 564 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47
Bankr. 835, 841 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985). Bankruptcy courts have found that by requiring
the balance of the equities clearly to favor rejection, "Congress intended to clarify that
rejection was only appropriate where the equities balance decidedly in favor of rejection."
Id.; see In re Walway Co., 69 Bankr. 967, 974 n.18 (Bankr. ED. Mich. 1987); In re Cook
United, Inc., 50 Bankr. 561, 564 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (quoting Salt Creek).
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
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The first reported decision interpreting section 1113 developed a nine-
step test to determine if the statute's requirements have been met."
2
Seven of the nine steps are devoted to whether the debtor has complied
with the procedural aspects of section 1113(b) by negotiating in good
faith," 3 while the last two ask whether the union has rejected the
debtor's proposal without good cause' 14 and whether the balance of the
equities clearly favors rejection. 1' 5 The majority of courts that have in-
terpreted section 1113 have adopted this test. 16 The test's most contro-
112. See In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907, 909 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
The American Provision court set out the nine steps as follows:
1. The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the Union to modify the
[CBA].
2. The proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable information
available at the time of the proposal.
3. The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the reorganization
of the debtor.
4. The proposed modifications must assure that all creditors, the debtor and all
of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.
5. The debtor must provide the Union such relevant information as is necessary
to evaluate the proposal.
6. Between the time of the making of the proposal and the time of the hearing
on approval of the rejection of the existing [CBA], the debtor must meet at
reasonable times with the Union.
7. At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting to reach
mutually satisfactory modifications of the [CBA].
8. The Union must have refused to accept the proposal without good cause.
9. The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the [CBA].
Id. (footnote omitted).
113. See supra note 112 (steps one through seven). See generally Vian, The Rejection
of Collective Bargaining Agreements Since the 1984 Amendments: The Case Law Under
New Bankruptcy Code Section 1113, 91 Comm. L.J. 252, 254-63 (1986).
114. See supra note 112 (step eight).
115. See supra note 112 (step nine).
116. See In re Sol-Sieff Produce Co., 82 Bankr. 787, 791-92 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988);
In re Amherst Sparkle Mkt., Inc., 75 Bankr. 847, 849 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re
Walway Co., 69 Bankr. 967, 972 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re William P. Brogna and
Co., 64 Bankr. 390, 393 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52
Bankr. 797, 800-01 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 50
Bankr. 969, 974-75 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 52 Bankr. 997 (W.D. Pa. 1985), vacated
and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United
Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Cook United, Inc., 50 Bankr. 561, 563
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re K&B Mounting, Inc., 50 Bankr. 460, 463-64 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1985); In re Carey Transp., Inc., 50 Bankr. 203, 207 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d
82 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 837-38 (Bankr. D. Wyo.
1985). But see In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 Bankr. 403, 406 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986) ("[t]his court eschews the talismanic nine-step analysis of Bankruptcy Code § 1113
first used in Ih re American Provision Co."), aff'd on other grounds, 78 Bankr. 671
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Courts that have not followed the nine-step test have followed the express language of
the statute. See In re Valley Kitchens, Inc., 52 Bankr. 493, 495-96 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985) (finding statutory requirements not met where certain proposed modifications re-
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versial element is the determination, at the procedural level, whether the
proposed modifications are "necessary to permit the reorganization of
the debtor."'' 17
The problem with the necessity requirement stems from section 11 13's
ambiguous language' and the lack of House, Senate, or committee re-
ports to clarify how necessary the modifications must be and to what end
suited in no savings to debtor); In re Fiber Glass Indus., Inc., 49 Bankr. 202, 203-04
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that proposal must be made postpetition, provide for
necessary modifications, and be based upon correct and reliable information; that debtor
must provide union with relevant information, and meet with union representative; and
that court shall approve only if union's refusal of proposal was without good cause, and
equities favor rejection); In re Allied Delivery Sys. Co., 49 Bankr. 700, 701 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1985) (holding that rejection is conditioned on proposal being based on complete
and reliable information and providing for necessary modifications treating all parties
fairly and equitably; debtor providing union with relevant data and meeting with union in
good faith; union refusing the proposal without good cause; and the equities favoring
rejection).
117. In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907, 909 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). Com-
pare Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1987)
(debtor must show its proposed modifications necessary to allow successful reorganiza-
tion, but modifications need not be absolutely minimal) with Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1986) (debtor must show
its proposed modifications essential to prevent debtor's liquidation). Of the other eight
steps, steps one, that the debtor has made a proposal to the union, two, that the proposal
is based on complete and reliable information, five, that the debtor provided the union
with relevant information to evaluate the proposal, and six, that the debtor and the union
have met at reasonable times, are merely factual questions. See, e.g., In re Amherst Spar-
kle Mkt., Inc., 75 Bankr. 847, 850-53 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Kentucky Truck
Sales, Inc., 52 Bankr. 797, 801-02, 804 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re K & B Mounting,
Inc., 50 Bankr. 460, 467-68 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985); In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47
Bankr. 835, 841 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
Two other steps, step seven, the good faith requirements, and, step eight, good cause
requirements, have been construed as directly dependent on the debtor satisfying the ne-
cessity requirement. See In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 Bankr. 460, 465 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1985); In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 841 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
Moreover, the courts have construed the fair and equitable requirement (step four)
relatively uniformly. Compare Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers,
791 F.2d 1074, 1091 (3d Cir. 1986) (congressional intent of the fair and equitable require-
ment is that employees do not bear a disproportionate share of the reorganization bur-
den) with Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1987)
("The purpose of this provision . . . 'is to spread the burden of saving the company to
every constituency while ensuring that all sacrifice to a similar degree.'" (quoting Cen-
tury Brass Prods. v. UAW (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795 F.2d 265, 273 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986))). Accordingly, "[flair and equitable treatment does not
of necessity mean identical or equal treatment," In re Allied Delivery Sys. Co., 49 Bankr.
700, 703 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), but that all the afrected parties shoulder a proportion-
ate share of the burden. See In re Carey Transp., Inc., 50 Bankr. 203, 210 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d
82 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 838-39 (Bankr. D. Wyo.
1985). Consideration includes burdens carried pre- as well as postpetition. See Truck
Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1987).
Last, Courts uniformally have construed the balancing-of-equities standard (step nine)
to be essentially the same as that enunciated by the Supreme Court in Bildisco. See supra
note 110.
118. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1086
(3d Cir. 1986); see also 130 Cong. Rec. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen.
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they must be necessary. 1 9 Accordingly, most courts have attempted to
construe the necessity requirement of section 1113 by referring to the
comments of its sponsors in Congress1 20 and by comparing the proposed
forms of the section with the version ultimately adopted by Congress. 12'
The courts that have done so have reached conflicting results. 122
II. THE NECESSITY REQUIREMENT
Facing substantially similar factual situations, the Second and Third
Circuits have reached substantially different conclusions as to the mean-
ing of the necessity requirement. In Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v.
United Steelworkers,123 the Third Circuit held that a debtor may not use
section 1113(c) to reject a CBA unless the proposed modifications are
essential to prevent liquidation.124 In Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey
Transportation Inc.,' 25 the Second Circuit held that the necessity require-
ment of section 1113(b) is satisfied if the debtor has proposed, in
good faith, modifications necessary to its successful, long-term
reorganization.1
26
In Wheeling-Pittsburgh,127 the Third Circuit found that the comments
of the legislators indicated that the procedures and standards of section
1113 were those of the Packwood amendment.128 Accordingly, it deter-
mined that the word "necessary" must be construed strictly because the
Thurmond) ("Legitimate concerns have been raised regarding the broadness and vague-
ness of [the language in section 1113(b)].").
119. See Century Brass Prods. v. UAW (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795 F.2d
265, 274 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v.
United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1086 (3d Cir. 1986).
120. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 88-89 (2d Cir.
1987); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1086-88
(3d Cir. 1986); In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 Bankr. 460, 464 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985);
In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 838 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985). But see In re
Carey Transp., Inc., 50 Bankr. 203, 207 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[T]his Court declines
to give substantial weight to the aforementioned legislative statements and instead will be
guided by the plain meaning of the statutory language ... and by what little caselaw
exists."), aff'd sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1987).
121. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir.
1987); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1086-88
(3d Cir. 1986); In re Allied Delivery Sys. Co., 49 Bankr. 700, 702 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985).
122. Compare Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir.
1987) ("[T]he legislative history strongly suggests that 'necessary' should not be equated
with 'essential' or bare minimum.") with Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steel-
workers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1086-88 (3d Cir. 1986) (determining from the congressional
statements that "necessary" should be construed strictly, and rejecting as "hypertechni-
cal" the argument that "necessary" and "essential" have different meanings).
123. 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
124. See id. at 1088-89.
125. 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
126. See id. at 90.
127. 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
128. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074,
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Packwood amendment allowed only "minimum modifications [in the
employees' benefits and protections] that would permit the reorganiza-
tion." 129 As a result, the court construed the phrase "a proposal...
which provides for those necessary modifications in the employees [sic]
benefits and protections"13 to mean the debtor's proposal can contain
only those modifications essential to the debtor's livelihood.' 3 ' Thus, it
was found that the debtor could not submit a proposal to modify the
existing CBA over a five-year period without providing for restorations
in worker pay if the debtor performed better than projected.' 32 Simi-
larly, the court interpreted the phrase "modifications ... to permit the
reorganization of the debtor"'133 as meaning that any proposal made by
the debtor must contain only those modifications that would prevent im-
mediate liquidation,134 rather than those modifications that would permit
successful, long-term reorganization. 135
In Carey,'36 the Second Circuit disagreed sharply with the Wheeling-
Pittsburgh holding.3 7 The Carey court examined the legislative history
of section 1113 and found it dispositive that the Committee had changed
the word "minimum" in the Packwood amendment to "necessary."' 38 It
thereby concluded that "necessary" should not be equated with essential
or bare minimum. 31 In addition, the court held that the section focuses
not on the prevention of the debtor's liquidation, but rather on the
debtor's likelihood of successful reorganization."4 Thus, it affirmed the
bankruptcy court's finding "that the proposed modifications [were] nec-
essary to rehabilitate the debtor into a competitive business enterprise in
its particular market and to provide for a successful reorganization."' 4
A. The Procedural Hurdles of Section 1113(b)
From the legislative statements, earlier drafts and final form of section
1113, it is apparent Congress intended to allow debtors to propose modi-
1087-88 (3d Cir. 1986); supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text (discussing Packwood
amendment).
129. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1088
(3d Cir. 1986) (quoting 130 Cong. Rec. S6181 (daily ed. May 22, 1984)).
130. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
131. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1088
(3d Cir. 1986).
132. See id. at 1089-90.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
134. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1089
(3d Cir. 1986).
135. See iL
136. 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
137. 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
138. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir.
1987).
139. See iL at 90.
140. See id. at 89-90.
141. In re Carey Transp., Inc., 50 Bankr. 203, 209 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub
norn. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
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fications in CBA's necessary to a successful reorganization, not merely
those essential to the debtor's short-term survival.
First, in analyzing section 1113, or, as the Third Circuit did in Wheel-
ing-Pittsburgh, the Packwood amendment, 42 it becomes clear that the
primary purpose of both is to place the responsibility for modifying any
CBA on the parties,' 43 thereby minimizing the need for judicial interven-
tion. 1" To effectuate this purpose, both the statute and its predecessor
amendment set procedural hurdles to force the debtor to propose modifi-
cations in the CBA. 4  The presumption is that if the debtor proposes
modifications in good faith146 and fully discloses the information to en-
able the union to confirm the debtor's need for such modifications,' 47 the
union will have an incentive to negotiate a settlement, and thereby pre-
serve the jobs of its members, rather than gamble on its ability to con-
vince the court that its refusal to do so is justified. 41 Conversely,
requiring the debtor to comply with the standards of section 1113 pro-
tects the union from a debtor seeking rejection when it is unnecessary for
its reorganization.
The effect of interpreting "necessary to permit reorganization" as
meaning "essential to prevent liquidation" would be to discourage good
faith negotiation and prevent modifications of CBA's in all but the most
dire cases. If courts set the specific procedural hurdles too high, as the
Third Circuit has done, then they remove the incentive to negotiate a
142. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074,
1086-87 (3d Cir. 1986).
143. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
144. See Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. UAW (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795
F.2d 265, 273 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); 130 Cong. Rec. S8898 (daily
ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood); 130 Cong. Rec. S6184 (daily ed. May
22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
145. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b) (Supp. IV 1986); Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey
Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 1987); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United
Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1088 (3d Cir. 1986); 130 Cong. Rec. S6184 (daily ed. May
22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
146. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986); supra note 12.
147. See In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 Bankr. 460, 467-68 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985);
In re Carey Transp., Inc., 50 Bankr. 203, 208 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub nom.
Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987); 130 Cong.
Rec. S6184 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
148. See 130 Cong. Rec. S6184 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood);
Note, Bankruptcy and the Union's Bargain: Equitable Treatment of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1015, 1051 (1987) (stating reasons why a union may resist
requested modifications in a CBA made by a debtor). A union might actually resist mod-
ification in order to cause liquidation of the debtor. See Bordewieck & Countryman,
supra note 39, at 319. For example, the union may wish to sacrifice employees covered by
the debtor's CBA in order to preserve the rights of other union members under CBA's
with solvent employers. See Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive
Board of Las Vegas, Culinary Workers Union, Local No. 226 (In re Landmark Hotel &
Casino, Inc.), 78 Bankr. 575, 578, 580 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (union rejected debtor's
modification of its CBA because a clause in other CBA's with different employers re-
quired that if one employer received concessions from union, union would have to extend
those concessions to all other employers).
1988] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN BANKRUPTCY
settlement, because a union always can reject some or all of a debtor's
proposal, whether in good faith or not, as not essential to prevent liquida-
tion. 49 On appeal to the bankruptcy court, this high standard makes it
almost impossible for the debtor to prove the union's refusal was unjusti-
fied. Accordingly, rather than encouraging negotiated modifications in
CBA's, this interpretation discourages them by placing the debtor in an
unfair bargaining position, 150 because it enables the union to use the
threat of an almost certainly unfavorable bankruptcy court ruling as lev-
erage against the debtor. This would make the debtor's remedy of rejec-
tion difficult to realize, denying it an important remedial device and
defeating the Bankruptcy Code's goal of flexibility.' 5
In contrast, allowing the debtor to make modifications that are neces-
sary to successful, long-term reorganization gives it the room to bargain
in good faith. Moreover, because the necessity requirement is viewed as
a mechanism to give both parties the incentive to negotiate in good
faith, "'52 courts have held that where a debtor-in-possession has shown no
more than the desirability or convenience of obtaining certain modifica-
tions, it has failed to show that they are necessary. 53 Thus, interpreting
the necessity requirement as allowing the debtor to propose those modifi-
cations it believes are appropriate to permit reorganization puts the
debtor and the union in equal bargaining positions, thus encouraging ne-
gotiation and decreasing the need for judicial intervention.
Further examination also makes it clear that the original House bill,
the Packwood amendment, and, therefore, section 1113, mandate that
the debtor's proposal must be made with a view to aiding long-term reor-
ganization.15 4 Although the original House bill would have allowed
modifications to serve successful long-term reorganization,' it would
have required the debtor to compromise this goal for the immediate pres-
ervation of jobs.'56 It also required the bankruptcy court to determine
that, absent rejection of the CBA, the debtor would liquidate." 7 The
Packwood amendment liberalized these strict standards by requiring that
the relative sacrifice of the workers merely be one of several factors the
149. See In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 Bankr. 403, 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd, 78 Bankr. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Gibson, supra note 31 at 341.
150. See In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 Bankr. at 407.
151. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 525 (1984).
152. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
153. See e.g., In re Valley Kitchens, Inc., 52 Bankr. 493, 495-97 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985); In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 Bankr. 460, 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
154. See 130 Cong. Rec. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood); 130 Cong. Rec. S6181 (daily ed. May 22, 1984); 130 Cong. Rec. H1842
(daily ed. March 21, 1984); Wines, An Overview of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendment"
Some Modest Protection for Labor Agreements, 36 Lab. L.J. 911, 917 (1985).






debtor must consider in making its proposal,"5 8 and by substituting the
balancing-of-the-equities standard for the essential-to-prevent-liquidation
standard of the House bill.' 59 The Packwood amendment, however, pre-
served the House bill's focus on successful reorganization.' 60 Accord-
ingly, because Congress did not alter the language of this portion of the
Packwood amendment, Congress adopted the amendment's focus.
Moreover, the final form of section 1113, when read in conjunction
with the rest of the Bankruptcy Code, indicates that debtors should be
able to focus their proposals toward long-term reorganization. Although
reorganization does not mean the debtor must develop a comprehensive
plan of reorganization at this initial stage in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing,16 1 it does mean that successful reorganization forms the ultimate
purpose behind the debtor's action.' 61 Section 1129(a)(11) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code 16 3 states that in order to confirm a plan of reorganization,
the bankruptcy court must examine the feasibility of the debtor achieving
fiscal health."M Section 1113 and the legislative statements must be read
in conjunction with this feasibility requirement.' 65 Accordingly, any
proposal made by the debtor must be made with a view toward success-
ful, long-term reorganization, rather than toward merely preventing
liquidation. 166
Once it is accepted that the debtor's proposals should relate to the
success of a confirmed, long-term plan of reorganization, which poten-
tially lies years away, a requirement that these proposals be essential to
that future reorganization is absurd, because it is impossible for the
debtor or the bankruptcy court to know what modifications in a CBA are
essential to an event so far away.' 67 Another aspect of section 1113's
legislative history also indicates that the necessity requirement should
not be construed as allowing debtors to propose only essential modifica-
158. See 130 Cong. Rec. 56181 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984); supra note 99 and accompa-
nying text.
159. See id. at S6182; supra note 100 and accompanying text.
160. See 130 Cong. Rec. 58898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (Statement of Sen. Packwood)
("As to the first requirement [of § 1113], similar to the proposal which I had made, only
modifications which are necessary to successful reorganization may be proposed."); supra
note 93 and accompanying text.
161. See 130 Cong. Rec. S8892 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
supra note 25.
162. See 130 Cong. Rec. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
163. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1982).
164. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus.
Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 589 (6th Cir.
1986) (discussing factors relevent to determining feasibility of a debtor's plan of
reorganization).
165. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir.
1987); In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 Bankr. 403, 417 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd, 78 Bankr. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
166. See Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d at 89; In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62
Bankr. at 417.
167. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72, 80 (3d Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
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tions in CBA's: Congress rejected language mandating only minimal
modifications. 168
Moreover, because Congress in section 1113(e) 169 expressly provides
debtors with emergency, interim relief from CBA's if such relief is found
to be essential to prevent liquidation,' it could not have intended that
the same standard be applied to the necessity requirement of section
1113(b).' 71 Otherwise, a debtor truly facing liquidation would use the
emergency procedures found in 1113(e) to obtain relief rather than the
elaborate procedures of sections 1113(b) and (c). Although section
1113(e) provides only interim relief,'72 that relief can be structured to
extend past the confirmation of a plan of reorganization, or even allow
rejection of a CBA. 7 3 Clearly, Congress did not intend section 1113(e)
to be used as a by-pass of sections 1113(b) and (c).' 7 4 Therefore, section
1113(b) must not be focused on the short-term, but oriented to the suc-
cessful reorganization of the debtor.
In addition to running counter to the legislative history of section 1113
and section 1129(a)(1 1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the courts that interpret
the necessity requirement of section 1113(b) as meaning that debtors only
may make proposals essential to avoid liquidation render irrelevent the
substantive balancing-of-the-equities standard contained in section
1113(c).' 75 The legislators retained the balancing-of-equities requirement
so that, in situations where negotiations have failed, the bankruptcy
court would determine whether the CBA should be rejected. 76 Under
the Third Circuit's interpretation, the balancing-of-the-equities require-
ment does not fulfill its intended function; if modifications are essential to
avoid liquidation, and the union refuses them, the equities always will
balance in favor of rejection of the CBA. 77 In the alternative, if the
168. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir.
1987).
169. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
170. See id.; see, e.g., Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Board
of Las Vegas, Culinary Workers Union, Local No. 226 (In re Landmark Hotel & Casino,
Inc.), 78 Bankr. 575, 585 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987).
171. See In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 Bankr. 403,417-18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd, 78 Bankr. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Allied Delivery Sys. Co., 49 Bankr.
700, 702 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
172. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
173. See Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas,
Culinary Workers Union, Local No. 226 (In re Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc.), 78
Bankr. 575, 582 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987). In Landmark, the interim relief was fashioned in
such a way that the CBA was rejected. See id.
174. See In re Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc., 78 Bankr. at 582; In re Beckley Coal
Mining Co., 81 Bankr. 6, 7 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987).
175. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
176. See Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas,
Culinary Workers Union, Local No. 226 (In re Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc.), 78
Bankr. 575, 583 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987); In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 Bankr. 460, 466
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985); 130 Cong. Rec. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Thurmond).
177. See In re Sol-Sieff Produce Co., 82 Bankr. 787, 795 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re
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proposals made by the debtor are not found to be absolutely essential to
prevent liquidation, then the court will find that the debtor has not met
the requirements of section 1113(b) and will not perform a substantive
balancing of equities.178
B. Balancing the Equities
Although the Second Circuit's interpretation of the necessity require-
ment in Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation Inc. 179 is the
proper one, its reading of section 1113's balancing-of-the-equities re-
quirement shows how the balancing can be skewed in favor of the
debtor.18 0 The balancing-of-the-equities standard found in section 1113
codifies the Bildisco balance-of-interests approach.181 Accordingly, the
Second Circuit determined that the bankruptcy court is bound to "focus
on the ultimate goal of Chapter 11 when considering these equities.
1 82
It noted that "[t]he Bankruptcy Code does not authorize freewheeling
consideration of every conceivable equity, but rather only how the equi-
ties relate to the success of the reorganization."'83 As a result, the Sec-
ond Circuit gleaned six "permissible equitable considerations" to be
evaluated. 184 Of the six, however, four clearly are structured to favor the
Walway Co., 69 Bankr. 967, 973-74 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Kentucky Truck
Sales, Inc., 52 Bankr. 797, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
178. See In re William P. Brogna and Co., 64 Bankr. 390, 393 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986)
(applying the essential-to-avoid-liquidation standard and finding that where the debtor
fails to meet this requirement balancing of the equities need only be done for
"completeness").
179. 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
180. See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text (discussing equities balanced in
Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc.).
181. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); supra note 110.
182. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1987)
(quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984)).
183. Id. at 92-93 (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984)).
184. Id. at 93. The six equities are:
(1) the likelihood and consequences of liquidation if rejection is not permitted;
(2) the likely reduction in the value of creditors' claims if the bargaining agree-
ment remains in force; (3) the likelihood and consequences of a strike if the
bargaining agreement is voided; (4) the possibility and likely effect of any em-
ployee claims for breach of contract if rejection is approved; (5) the cost-spread-
ing abilities of the various parties, taking into account the number of employees
covered by the bargaining agreement and how various employees' wages and
benefits compare to those of others in the industry; and (6) the good or bad faith
of the parties in dealing with the debtor's financial dilemma.
Id.; see also In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 Bankr. 403, 408 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986) ("The balance of the equities... clearly favors rejection when it is apparent that a
debtor is in need of substantial relief under a union contract and the bargaining process
has failed to produce any results and is unlikely to produce results in the forseeable fu-
ture." (citation omitted), aff'd, 78 Bankr. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)); In re Kentucky Truck
Sales, Inc., 52 Bankr. 797, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) ("[The primary question in a
balancing test is the effect the rejection of the agreement will have on the debtor's pros-
pects for reorganization.").
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debtor.' The sixth equity appears to take the bad faith of the debtor
into account, 86 but the facts of the Carey case belie the court's apparent
concern that a debtor should not use Chapter 11 for the primary purpose
of ridding itself of its CBA. Ample evidence exists that the Carey debtor
did precisely that.' 87 The fifth equity is the only one to take into account
the effect rejection will have on the employees, 18 8 and even this concern
is conditioned upon creditors being able to bear the costs of the CBA. t89
The failure of the Second Circuit to take into account the hardship of
the employees runs directly counter to the mandate of Bildisco. Bildisco
expressly states that "the Bankruptcy Court must consider ... the im-
pact of rejection on the employees."' 9 Moreover, section 1113(c) codi-
fies this consideration.' 9 ' Accordingly, in striking a balance between the
interests of the debtor, its creditors, and its employees, the court "must
consider not only the degree of hardship faced by each party, but also
any qualitative differences between the types of hardship each may
face." 192
In practical terms, the hardship of the employees should be taken into
account because a debtor seeking to reject its CBA "can be expected to
argue that rejection is essential to a successful reorganization, whether it
believes that to be the case or not."' 93 In contrast, a union would be
foolish to argue against rejection if such was justified to prevent liquida-
tion, because with liquidation the union members' jobs would be lost.'
The equity balance, therefore, should at least reflect the possibility that
rejection of the CBA will not substantially promote successful reorgani-
185. See supra note 184. For example, if rejection should cause a strike, the equities
focus solely on the strike's effect on the debtor. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey
Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 93 (2d Cir. 1987). Moreover, if the contract is rejected, the
employees will have an unsecured prepetition claim against the estate, see supra note 31,
thus, it is unlikely that the employees' claim against the estate would have substantial
effect on the debtor. See infra note 195.
186. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 93 (2d Cir.
1987).
187. Not only did Carey begin the rejection process the day after it filed its petition for
reorganization, but it had stated to the union prior to entering Chapter 11 that if the
union failed to accept certain modifications in the agreement, Carey would be forced into
Chapter 11. See id. at 85. Moreover, the debtor's proposal pursuant to § 1113 sought
much deeper concessions than the prepetition proposal and the debtor rejected a union
counterproposal that was similar to one made by Carey prior to entering Chapter 11. See
In re Carey Transp., Inc., 50 Bankr. 203, 205 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.
1987). The bankruptcy court noted that Carey's financial difficulties were primarily a
result of excessive labor costs, which Carey attributed to its CBA. See id. at 204.
188. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 93 (2d Cir.
1987); supra note 184.
189. See Local Unions 20 v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc. (In re Brada Miller Freight
Sys., Inc.), 702 F.2d 890, 900 (11th Cir. 1983).
190. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).
191. See Gibson, supra note 31, at 347-48; supra note 110.
192. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).




zation, and in such cases rejection should not be used to subordinate the
claims of the debtor's employees. The bankruptcy court should take into
account the adequacy of the bankruptcy law to compensate unionized
employees for their monetary and nonmonetary losses. 195
CONCLUSION
Section 1113(b) acts as a procedural hurdle that, in order to encourage
debtors and unions to negotiate modifications of CBA's in good faith,
and to allow the courts to balance the equities only when the parties fail,
should be set neither too high nor too low. In considering the equities,
bankruptcy courts should focus on the need for the debtor to reorganize
successfully, but should temper this concern with adequate regard for the
effect that rejection of the CBA will have on the debtor's employees and
the adequacy of the bankruptcy laws to compensate the employees for
the loss of monetary and nonmonetary benefits. This will ensure that
CBA's will be rejected only in cases where good faith negotiations have
taken place and failed and where the equities in favor of both retention
and rejection have been considered.
Peter B. Brandow
195. Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986), requires that losses suffered by employees covered by a CBA as a result of its
rejection be estimated and accounted for in a plan of reorganization. See NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 530 n.12 (1984). This includes losses attributable to
fringe benefits or security provisions such as seniority rights. See id. But see Local Un-
ions 20 v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc. (In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc.), 702 F.2d
890, 900 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that nonmonetary benefits cannot be compensated
under reorganization plan). Moreover, bankruptcy courts have held that claims arising
out of rejection of a CBA are limited by § 502(b)(7). See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7) (Supp. IV
1986) (limiting claims arising from termination of employment contracts to one year of
compensation, without acceleration, following the earlier of the filing of petition for reor-
ganization or termination of the employment). See In re N & T Assoc., Inc., 78 Bankr.
285, 288 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987); In re Continental Airlines Corp., 64 Bankr. 865, 873
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986). But see In re Gee & Missler Serv., Inc., 62 Bankr. 841, 843
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (holding CBA's not to be employment contracts within the
meaning of § 502(b)(7)). Moreover, if the liquidation value of the estate is small, these
claimants probably would not receive compensation. See In re Carey Transp., Inc., 50
Bankr. 203, 213 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Truck Drivers
Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
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